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Abstract: Minimal constitutional amendment at accession forced constitutional courts in 
new member states to make great efforts to avoid conflicts with EC and EU law – 
The importance of expanding the equation of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’ beyond 
judicial actors, by involving political institutions – Cases on constitutional 
amendment in Poland, Estonia and Latvia – The concern over fundamental rights 
protection versus EC market regulation in Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic 
– Co-operative constitutionalism beyond judicial dialogues. 
 





The principle of supremacy has been the cornerstone of the European Community’s 
legal system, ensuring the uniform application and effectiveness of Community 
law. It is well established in the case-law of the European Court of Justice that 
Community law is supreme over the national law of the member states, including 
the fundamental norms of their national constitutions.1 At the same time, the 
basis and precise scope of supremacy have been at the heart of enduring judicial 
and academic debates. Whilst the principle of supremacy of Community law has 
generally been well recognised by the member states, certain reservations have 
been made by national constitutional courts. They regard supremacy as a concept 
rooted in the national constitutions, rather than deriving from the autonomous 
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nature of the Community legal order.2 Based on this, the constitutional courts 
have retained for themselves the right to review whether European Union institutions 
act within the competences conferred upon them and respect the fundamental 
constitutional norms and human rights. The well-known canon of relevant 
cases includes the Solange I and II 3 and Maastricht 4 decisions of the German 
Constitutional Court, the Granital 5 and Frontini 6 decisions of the Italian Constitutional 
Court, and the Maastricht decision7 of the Danish Supreme Court.8 
In France, new treaties are regularly subjected to preliminary review by the Constitutional 
Council, with the Constitution being amended prior to ratification if 
an incompatibility is found; this practice significantly reduces the risk of constitutional 
conflicts with Community law. 
Debates regarding supremacy have been revived following the incorporation of 
the supremacy clause in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.9 The 
French Constitutional Council and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal delivered 
important decisions on the meaning of supremacy in the context of the European 
Constitution. In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel concluded in November 
2004 that the supremacy clause in the European Constitutional Treaty would not 
entail changes to the position of the French Constitution at the top of the French 
internal legal order.10 In Spain, the Constitutional Tribunal developed, in a decision 
of December 2004, a distinction between ‘supremacy’ and ‘primacy’.11 On 
2 B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. Craig and 
G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) p. 177 at_p. 
199; K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of 
Law in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 59; M. Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate 
in the European Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006) p. 207. 
3 Solange I, [1974] 37 BverfGE 271 et seq.; Solange II, 73 BverfGE 378. 
4 Brunner, BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993) [1994] C.M.L.R., 57-108. 
5 Granital, Decision No. 170, 1984. 
6 Frontini, Decision No. 183, 1973. 
7 Carlsen v. Rasmussen, Judgment of 06.04.1998 [1999] C.M.L.R., 855-862. 
8 For a summary of these cases, see De Witte, supra n. 2, p. 199-205. For a comprehensive 
account and analysis of the relationships between the ECJ and national courts, see Claes, supra n. 2. 
9 See, e.g., M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy 
in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’, 11 European Law Journal (2005) p. 262. 
10 Décision No. 2004-505 DC – 19.11.2004, Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, 
<www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr>. For a comment, see, e.g., G. Carcassonne, ‘France Conseil 
Constitutionnel on the European Constitutional Treaty. Decision of 19 November 2004, 2004-505 
DC’, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 293; L. Azoulai and F. Ronkes Agerbeek, ‘Conseil constitutionnel (French 
Constitutional Court), Decision No. 2004-505 DC of 19 Nov. 2004, on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’, 42 CMLRev. (2005) p. 871. 
11 Constitutional Court of Spain, Declaration on the consistency of the European Constitutional 
Treaty with the Spanish Constitution, DTC 1/2004, 13 Dec. 2004. For a comment, see, e.g., 
C. B. Schutte, ‘Spain. Tribunal Constitucional on the European Constitution. Declaration of 13 
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its reading, primacy of EC law is limited to the exercise of the competences that 
have been conferred on the Community, whereas supremacy is implicit in the 
Spanish Constitution, which remains the underlying source of validity. Although 
the Spanish Constitution no longer forms the framework for assessing the validity 
of the Community rules, the Community legal order, which was accepted as a 
result of the surrender of competences, must nonetheless remain compatible with 
the basic principles and values of the Constitution.12 These decisions represent a 
continuation of the long-standing practice in which the national constitutional 
courts posit the ultimate supremacy of the national constitutions, without openly 
challenging the supremacy of Community law. This represents what has come to 
be known as ‘judicial dialogues’13 or ‘co-operative constitutionalism’,14 where the 
national courts and the Court of Justice have engaged in a co-operative relationship 
and conversation in resolving issues pertaining to the relationship between 
the Community and the national legal orders. 
Against this background, it is fitting to take stock of how the constitutional 
courts of the new member states that joined the European Union in 2004 have 
performed in such ‘co-operative constitutionalism’. At the time of entry, questions 
were posed as to whether challenges to the delicate balance that has gradually 
been constructed in terms of supremacy might become more frequent, given 
that the Central and Eastern European countries have powerful and ‘activist’ constitutional 
courts, and their constitutions posit supremacy of the constitutions 
and accord a strong protection to the principles of sovereignty and independence.15 
December 2004’, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 281; F. Castillo de la Torre, ‘Tribunal Constitucional, Opinion 
1/2004 of 13 December 2004, on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’, 42 CMLRev. 
(2005) p. 1169; R. Alonso García, ‘The Spanish Constitution and the European Constitution: The 
Script for a Virtual Collision and Other Observations on the Principle of Primacy’, 6 German Law 
Journal (2005) p. 1001. 
12 See on this distinction and on the implicit presence of this concept in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of some other member states, J. Ziller, ‘Conclusions’ and M. Claes, ‘The European 
Constitution and the Role of National Constitutional Courts’, in A. Albi and J. Ziller (eds.), The 
European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratification and Beyond (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International 2007) p. 287-295 and p. 235-247 respectively. 
13 A. Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community’, in A.M. Slaughter, 
A. Sweet Stone and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts ÿ Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1998) p. 325-326. 
14 A. Sajó, ‘Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court Shying Away from EU Supremacy’, 2 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 
(2004) p. 351. 
15 See A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 24 et seq. and p. 170-175; A. Albi, ‘“Europe” Articles in the 
Constitutions of the Central and Eastern European Countries’, 42 CMLRev. (2005) p. 399 at p. 403 
et seq. 
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Indeed, after accession, shockwaves were caused first by a judgment of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, and then, a year later, by two judgments of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal. The Hungarian Constitutional Court found that a 
national law implementing EU regulations on surplus sugar stocks was against the 
Hungarian Constitution;16 indeed, the issue of sugar stocks has led to difficult 
cases regarding protection of constitutional rights in the other new member states 
as well. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal annulled national provisions implementing 
the European Arrest Warrant framework decision17 due to their nonconformity 
with Article 55 of the Constitution, which prohibits the extradition 
of Polish nationals.18 This was followed by the Accession Treaty judgment, where 
the Tribunal held that the Constitution itself is the supreme law of the land, even 
in cases of conflict with Community law.19 Do these cases signify that the constitutional 
courts of the new member states might be entrenched in the traditional 
national constitutional setting and even hostile to the European Union? Indeed, it 
has been argued that the Hungarian Court has been slow to reassess its new role in 
the aftermath of Union membership, and ‘the state organs of new EU members 
still have to learn the rules of “co-operative constitutionalism”.’20 According to a 
recent EU law textbook by leading authors, the Polish Accession Treaty decision 
even goes as far as being the only one to represent the approach of ‘unconditional 
national constitutional sovereignty’,21 which ‘insists upon the continuing and 
unconditional sovereignty of the national constitutional order’.22 
However, embarking on an inquiry into the application of EC/EU law in the 
new member states, this article contends that the two aforementioned cases, alongside 
other cases across the region, show that the Central and Eastern European 
constitutional courts have actually gone to great lengths to avoid clashes with EC/ 
EU law, in their quest to find pragmatic, EU-friendly solutions. With regard to 
the Polish European Arrest Warrant decision, this is demonstrated by the fact 
16 Decision 17/2004 (V. 25) AB. 
17 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ [2002] L 190/1. 
18 Judgment of 27 April 2005 in Case P 1/05 [Wyrok z dnia 27 kwietnia 2005 r. Sygn. akt. P 1/ 
05] nyr. The summary of the judgment in English is available at the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
website <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/P_1_05_GB.pdf>. 
19 Judgment of 11 May 2005 in Case K 18/04 [Wyrok z dnia 11 maja 2005 r. Sygn. akt. K 18/ 
04] nyr. The summary of the judgment in English is available at the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
website <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf>. See also 
20 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 351. 
21 D. Chalmers et al., European Union Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 
198 and 201. 
22 Ibid, p. 199. 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘European Constitutional Law Review, 3: pp 25–67’ 
- 5 - 
 
 
that, even though the matter concerned the third pillar where supremacy does not 
apply, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal granted an 18-month period for the 
continuation of extradition, during which Parliament was to amend the Constitution. 
Importantly, the Polish European Arrest Warrant decision demonstrates 
that there exist genuine limits to EU-friendly interpretation. Article 55 of the 
Polish Constitution, which expressly prohibits the extradition of Polish nationals, 
had not been amended prior to accession despite numerous calls to this effect. 
This dovetails with a wider trend in the region: as has been pointed out earlier, the 
constitutional amendments in Poland and a number of other new member states 
from Central and Eastern Europe remained relatively minimal, with several constitutions 
still containing direct conflicts with EC/EU law.23 As accession referendums 
were imminent at the time, it was important to keep the constitutional 
revision to a low profile – a wider range of amendments could have fuelled the 
eurosceptics’ outcries about loss of sovereignty. However, after accession, such 
direct constitutional conflicts left some of the constitutional courts in a vexed 
position indeed. Besides alluding to the need to amend the constitutional provisions, 
it will be seen that some constitutional courts have additionally highlighted 
the need for the national parliaments to improve the drafting of national legislation, 
in order to ensure its constitutionality in the context of Union membership. 
Against this background, this article will show that whilst the discourse on the 
relationship between the Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts 
hitherto has predominantly focused on the dialogue and mutual co-operation 
between the courts in an attempt to avoid destructive conflicts, there are limits to 
EU-friendly interpretation of those constitutional provisions that are in a manifest 
conflict with EC/EU law. Therefore, the article will argue that the role of 
political institutions in such a ‘co-operative constitutionalism’, especially that of 
national parliaments, warrants further consideration. In addition, the article shows 
that the nascent EU-related case-law in the Central and Eastern European countries 
lends support to the concerns that have been voiced about the adequacy of 
the Union’s human rights protection standards, most forcefully in the wake of the 
notorious Solange and Banana sagas. 
‘Judicial dialogues’ in Europe 
The relationship between the European Court of Justice and national constitutional 
courts has come to be characterised as ‘judicial dialogues’24 or ‘co-operative 
constitutionalism’,25 which has been based on a structured and ongoing ‘conver- 
23 For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 78-121. 
24 Stone Sweet, supra n. 13, p. 325-326. 
25 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 351. 
Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘European Constitutional Law Review, 3: pp 25–67’ 
- 6 - 
 
 
sation’, co-operation and mutual trust. On the one hand, national constitutional 
courts have sent warnings to the Court of Justice about the need to respect fundamental 
rights and better to police the observance of the limits of European competence 
by the Union’s institutions. In doing so, a great deal of self-restraint has 
been displayed;26 the courts have refrained from acting in a destructive manner, 
with no national court yet having declared a piece of Union secondary legislation 
invalid. On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has heeded these warnings: 
even though some national decisions have been criticised as nationalist or 
even hostile to Community law, such decisions have served as a catalyst for the 
development of the fundamental rights jurisprudence by the Court of Justice, by 
way of protecting human rights as part of the general principles of Community 
law.27 More recently, the Court of Justice has shown sensitivity to the constitutional 
courts’ concerns about the Union institutions staying within the competences 
conferred upon them. By way of illustration, the Court found in Opinion 2/94 
that the European Union has no competence to accede to the European Convention 
on Human Rights without a prior Treaty amendment,28 it refused to extend 
horizontal direct effect to directives in the Dori case,29 and, in Tobacco Advertising 
Directive,30 it for the first time repealed a Community measure of political importance 
on the ground of lack of competence. Against this background, it has been 
commented that ‘[t]he principle of supremacy remains essentially “two-dimensional”, 
it is a complex, layered reality of dialogue and persuasion.’31 
This kind of judicial co-operation sits well with the pluralist approaches that 
have recently gained popularity in explaining the relationship between the Community 
and national legal orders. Whilst the Court of Justice’s case-law represents 
what has been characterised as an EU-centred approach to the ultimate locus of 
authority, and the national constitutional courts have taken a state-centred approach, 
the complex relationship between the national constitutional frameworks 
and the developing process of European legal integration has increasingly been 
26 See, e.g., Claes, supra n. 2, p. 534. 
27 For relevant cases, see, e.g., A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in 
Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) p. 171-172; S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of 
the European Union (London, Pearson Education 2002) p. 437 et seq. For a discussion of German 
literature, see M. Herdegen, ‘The Origins and Development of the General Principles of Community 
Law’, in U. Bernitz and J. Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000), p. 7 and 9-10. 
28 ECJ, Opinion 2/94 on Accession by the Community to the ECHR, [1996] ECR I-1759. 
29 ECJ, Case 91/92 Dori v. Recreb Srl. [1994] ECR I-3325. 
30 ECJ, Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR I-8419. 
31 Claes, supra n. 2, p. 670, citing both De Witte, supra n. 2, p. 209 and S. Weatherhill, ‘Is 
constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the cases for European constitutionalism and a European 
Constitution’, ConWeb 7/2002, p. 14. 
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presented in pluralist terms.32 Despite some variations, the pluralist concepts generally 
regard the national and European constitutional documents as no longer 
being the emanation of two independent legal orders, where the sovereign state is 
the ultimate source and centre of authority.33 Instead, the relationship between 
the orders ‘is now horizontal rather than vertical – heterarchical rather than hierarchical.’ 
34 Each highest court within a subsystem – constitutional courts, European 
Court of Justice, as well as other adjudicating bodies such as the European 
Court of Human Rights and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body – derives both 
authority and legitimacy from its own basic document,35 retaining ‘interpretative 
competence-competence’.36 The focus here is on the prevention of conflicts through 
co-operation and interaction. If conflicts nonetheless occur, these should be solved 
on the basis of certain principles, taking account of the concrete constitutional 
context, time and practicalities;37 on occasion ‘some political action’ may be necessary 
to produce a solution.38 
Whilst the focus of the judicial dialogues or co-operative constitutionalism has 
been on the interaction between the courts at different levels, the role of other 
actors, such as parliaments, in such a dialogue or co-operation has received negligible 
consideration. The subsequent analysis of the EU-related cases in a number 
of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe highlights the importance 
of expanding the equation of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’ beyond judicial 
actors, by involving political institutions at both the national and the Union 
level into such co-operation. 
Some broader remarks on Central and Eastern European 
constitutional courts 
It has been pointed out that in the history of European integration, the Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz disputes have arisen in those member states that have constitutional 
32 For an overview of the different schools of thought, see Kumm, supra n. 9, p. 265 et seq. 
33 See, e.g., N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999) p. 105; N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, 65 MLR (2002) p. 317; M. Kumm, ‘Who is the final arbiter of constitutionality in 
Europe?: three conceptions of the relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Justice’, 36 CMLRev. (1999) p. 351; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual 
Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2003) p. 523-524. 
34 Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, supra n. 33, p. 337. 
35 MacCormick, supra n. 33, Chapter 7; Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in 
Walker, Sovereignty in Transition, supra n. 33, p. 3-32; Kumm, supra n. 33, p. 375-376. 
36 MacCormick, supra n. 33, p. 259. 
37 E.g., Kumm, supra n. 33, p. 356. 
38 MacCormick, supra n. 33, p. 265. 
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courts, as they have rendered the reception of supremacy contingent on certain 
conditions.39 Unlike other courts, the constitutional courts insist that it is the 
national constitutions, instead of the Court of Justice or the EC Treaties, that 
mediate the relationship between Community law and national law.40 This observation 
is of major importance in the context of Union enlargement, as the 
constitutional courts in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
have a powerful status and a tradition of far-reaching judicial activism in re-building 
the independent legal systems of these countries after the breakdown of the 
totalitarian regime.41 As Wojciech Sadurski has noted, ‘[o]ne of the most striking 
features of the ongoing transitions to democracy in these societies is the spectacular 
growth in the role and prominence of constitutional courts and tribunals in 
shaping the new constitutional order.’42 
Three other specific concerns should be outlined, which might potentially complicate 
the position of the Central and Eastern European constitutional courts on 
the landscape of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’. Firstly, unlike the constitutions 
of the old member states, most Central and Eastern European constitutions accord 
a stronger protection to sovereignty than their Western European counterparts, 
and they also expressly establish the principle that the constitution is the 
highest legal source in the country.43 Some also directly prohibit ratification of 
treaties that are in conflict with the constitution. In addition, the Constitutional 
Courts of Hungary and Slovenia have cautioned in their earlier case-law that the 
constitutions may not be amended in a disguised way by ratification of treaties; 
the rule of law and legitimacy require the parliaments to respect the more stringent 
constitutional amendment procedures.44 Although provisions were introduced 
in several new member states to the effect of securing supremacy and direct 
effect of Community law,45 at the time of their introduction, these provisions 
generally were regarded as not affecting the supremacy of the constitutions. 
39 Stone Sweet, supra n. 13, p. 325. 
40 Ibid. 
41 On the constitutional courts of Central and Eastern Europe, see W. Sadurski (ed.), Constitutional 
Justice, East and West. Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist 
Europe in a Comparative Perspective (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002); J. Priban et al. 
(eds.), Systems of Justice in Transition. Central European Experiences since 1989 (Aldershot, Ashgate 
2003). 
42 W. Sadurski, ‘Constitutional Justice, East and West: Introduction’ in Sadurski, supra n. 41, 
p. 1. 
43 E.g., Art. 8 of the Polish Constitution; Art. 7 of the Lithuanian Constitution; Art. 77(1) of 
the Hungarian Constitution. For the English text of these and other constitutions, see the International 
Constitutional Law website <www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html>. 
44 E.g., Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 30/1998 on the Europe Agreement (VI 25) 
AB, Magyar Közlöny; Slovenian Constitutional Court Decision No. RM-1/97, 05.06.1997, Uradni 
list RS, No. 40/97, on Europe Agreement, in English <www.us-rs.si/en>, para. 35-38. 
45 For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 67 et seq. 
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Secondly, as Zdenek Kühn and Siniša Rodin have discussed in more detail, the 
Central and Eastern European judges tend to take the approach of legal formalism 
and textual positivism (although this holds less true at the level of constitutional 
courts).46 Whilst the legal landscape in the western world was shaped by 
rational discourse, the predominant discourse in Central and Eastern Europe during 
the Communist period was authoritarian, with one truth being imposed as 
universal and final.47 As a result, legal scholarship was not expected to be critical 
but descriptive and apologetic, with courts being reluctant to depart from literal 
interpretations of laws.48 A tradition of textual reading of the law by the judges, 
coupled with a weakness in applying abstract legal principles, may pose challenges 
to the application of Community law, which involves an ample measure of teleological 
interpretation, with an important place being held by the general principles 
of law.49 Furthermore, given the pluralist dimension of the interaction 
between the national and the Community legal orders, challenges might be posed 
by the Kelsenian concept of the legal system as a pyramid, which holds a strong 
position in Central and Eastern Europe, as a reaction to the Communist system 
where the classic hierarchy of legal sources had disappeared and government decrees 
abounded.50 51 
Thirdly, it might be worth noting that during the Communist period, the 
courts did not deal with the application of international law (with the exception 
of the Polish courts to some extent).52 The Communist constitutions did not 
contain provisions on the position and applicability of international treaties; these 
had to be ratified and transposed by national law according to the dualist concept 
governing the Socialist sphere.53 However, after the regime change, constitutions 
46 Z. Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) 
Predictions’, 6 German Law Journal (2005) p. 563; S. Rodin ‘Discourse and Authority in European 
and Post-Communist Legal Culture’, 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law (2005) p. 1, esp. p. 7-8. 
See also T. Capeta, ‘Courts, Legal Culture and EU Enlargement’, 1 Croatian Yearbook of European 
Law (2005) p. 23. However, Michal Bobek has noted that if the courts of the other member states 
were taken as comparators, rather than the European Court of Justice, the situation might not be 
that much different. See M. Bobek, ‘A New or a Non-existent Legal Order? Some Early Experience 
in the Application of EU Law in Central Europe’, 2 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 
(2006), forthcoming. 
47 Rodin, supra n. 46, p. 7-12. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Kühn, supra n. 46, p. 576 and p. 564; see also Capeta, supra n. 46, p. 31 et seq. 
50 Kühn, supra n. 46, p. 574 (references omitted). 
51 For a broader discussion of the points raised in this and the previous paragraph, see W. Weiss, 
‘East Enlargement and the Legal Discourse in the EU’, paper presented at the workshop ‘Integration 
or Absorption? Legal Discourses in the Enlarged Union’, University of Hanover, 27-29 Sept. 
2006, on file with the author. 
52 See also Kühn, supra n. 46, p. 565. 
53 T. Schweisfurth and R. Alleweldt, ‘The Position of International Law in the Central and 
Eastern European Countries’, 40 German Yearbook of International Law (1997) p. 165, with refer- 
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were opened up to international law,54 and the Central and Eastern European 
courts have readily referred to international instruments, especially the European 
Convention on Human Rights and relevant case-law. The constitutions were subsequently 
revised in relation to Union membership.55 Furthermore, in the years 
leading up to the accession to the Union, the judges in the region underwent 
intensive training in EU law in the framework of various programmes organised 
by the Union as well as governments of several old member states. As a matter of 
fact, the extent of training has given ground even to remarks about Central and 
Eastern European judges perhaps having become better informed of EU law than 
judges from provincial areas of some older member states. 
Nevertheless, a question arises as to whether the entry of Central and Eastern 
European courts into the Union’s constitutional landscape might further exacerbate 
the tensions between Community law and national constitutions. Furthermore, 
it should be recalled that the Central and Eastern European constitutional 
courts have been profoundly influenced by the German Constitutional Court in 
the methodology and style of their judicial reasoning;56 the German Constitutional 
Court, of course, has been the foremost guardian of the national constitutional 
limits to European integration. However, contrary to what might have been 
expected from these somewhat pessimistic background remarks, the subsequent 
sections will show that the Central and Eastern European constitutional courts 
have displayed inventiveness in finding pragmatic solutions to avoid conflicts with 
Community law. The fact that they have done so despite the potential difficulties 
outlined above further corroborates the thesis, which will be developed in more 
detail below, that the Central and Eastern European courts have taken a pro- 
European approach. 
Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
The principle of EU-friendly interpretation 
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s stance on EC/EU law is predominantly known 
for the dramatic decision in the above-mentioned European Arrest Warrant case. 
ence to E. Stein, ‘International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern 
European Constitutions?’, 88 American Journal of International Law (1994) p. 427 at p. 432. See 
also with regard to Poland W. Czaplinski, ‘The Relationship between International Law and Polish 
Municipal Law in the Light of the 1997 Constitution and Jurisprudence’, Droit Polonais Contemporain 
(1999), p. 19-20. 
54 Stein, supra n. 53, p. 427-450. 
55 For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 67 et seq. 
56 See Z. Kühn, ‘Constitutional Monologues, Constitutional Dialogues or Constitutional Cacophony? 
European Arrest Warrant Saga in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic’, paper presented 
at the workshop ‘Integration or Absorption? Legal Discourses in the Enlarged Union’, University 
of Hanover, 27-29 Sept. 2006, on file with the author. 
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However, this decision does not appear to reflect the situation adequately: this 
section will demonstrate that the Court has gone to great lengths in interpreting 
the Polish Constitution in an EU-friendly way in its earlier decisions. In order to 
understand the decisions better, it is instructive to outline the relevant constitutional 
provisions in Poland. 
Poland adopted a new Constitution in 1997,57 with Article 90(1) allowing the 
country to delegate certain competences to international organisations, and 
Article 91 establishing direct effect and supremacy of ratified international agreements 
and secondary law.58 However, there were calls for amending the Constitution 
prior to accession to the European Union, to remove certain conflicts that 
might nonetheless arise with regard to EC/EU law.59 The problematic provisions 
included the following: Article 62(1), under which voting rights in local elections 
are the preserve of Polish citizens; Article 227(1), which bestows the National 
Bank of Poland with the exclusive right to issue the Polish currency; and Articles 
52(4) and 55, which prohibit the extradition of Polish citizens. However, amending 
the Constitution would have posed the risk of strengthening the nationalist 
anti-EU movements ahead of the then imminent accession referendum, given 
that public support for accession had been a borderline 50%. Furthermore, it 
would have been difficult to secure the necessary political support, as constitutional 
amendments required the approval of two parliamentary chambers and 
involved the possibility of holding a referendum.60 
It did not take long for the Constitutional Tribunal to be seized with regard to 
conflicts between the above provisions and Community law. To begin with, in a 
case decided on 31 May 2004, a group of Sejm (lower house of Parliament) members 
argued that the 2004 Act on the Elections to the European Parliament was 
unconstitutional, for the reason that the participation of foreign nationals was in 
conflict with the principle of the sovereignty of the Polish people (Article 4(1) of 
the Constitution), as well as with the clauses that grant the right to vote to Polish 
57 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997; for an English version, see the International 
Constitutional Law website <www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html>. 
58 See in more detail, e.g., S. Biernat, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Poland’s Future Membership in 
the European Union’, 36 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1998) p. 398; J. Barcz, ‘Membership of Poland in 
the European Union in the Light of the Constitution of 2 April 1997’, 23 Polish Yearbook of International 
Law Handbook on 
European Enlargement. A Commentary on the Enlargement Process (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2002) p. 299. 
59 See K. Wojtowicz, ‘Proposed Changes in the Polish Constitution of 1997 Ahead of Poland’s 
Accession to the European Union’, 25 Polish Yearbook of International Law (2001), p. 40-44; S. 
Biernat, ‘The Openness of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland Towards European Integration’, 
in G. Amato et al. (eds.), The Constitutional Revision in Today’s Europe (Esperia Publications, 
London 2002) p. 439 at 445 et seq. 
60 See in more detail Biernat, supra n. 59, p. 446 et seq. 
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citizens only. According to Article 19 EC Treaty, every citizen of the Union residing 
in a member state of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections and elections to the European Parliament. 
The Constitutional Tribunal rejected the claim.61 It underlined the importance 
of the constitutional principle mandating an EU-friendly interpretation of 
national law. According to the Tribunal, ‘[w]hil[e] interpreting legislation in force, 
account should be taken of the constitutional principle of favourable predisposition 
towards the process of European integration and the cooperation between 
States.’62 According to the Tribunal, the Polish Constitution is the supreme act 
establishing the legal basis for the existence of the Polish State; however, it does 
not apply to structures other than the Polish State.63 Under Articles 90(1) and (3) 
of the Constitution, in combination with the Accession Treaty, certain powers 
were delegated to the EU level; the review of the acts of Union bodies is a matter 
for Union law, and Polish implementing provisions and the Constitution may not 
be deployed for reviewing the constitutionality of political decision-making at the 
EU level. 
A similar pragmatic approach followed in the Accession Treaty case.64 The 
claimants, coming from amongst three political groups of the Sejm that were opposed 
to Poland’s European Union membership, argued that a number of provisions 
in the Accession Treaty and EC/EU Treaties were in conflict with the Polish 
Constitution, especially with the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of 
the Polish people and the supremacy of the Constitution within the Polish legal 
system. The numerous alleged conflicts arose, inter alia, from the right of Union 
citizens to vote and stand in both European Parliament and municipal elections, 
the adoption of the common currency, and changes affecting the separation of 
powers. 
The Tribunal dismissed all claims. As regards the municipal elections, the Tribunal 
found that the above-mentioned Article 4 (on the sovereignty of the Polish 
people) does not encompass local elections, and Article 62(1), which guarantees 
to the Polish citizens the right to elect, inter alia, their representatives to local selfgovernment 
bodies, does not preclude the possibility of according the right to the 
citizens of other states. The Tribunal equally rejected the applicants’ claim that the 
powers of the European Central Bank were in conflict with Article 227(1) of the 
Polish Constitution, which establishes the National Bank of Poland as the central 
bank of the State and vests therein the exclusive right to issue money and to 
61 Judgment of 31.05.2004, K 15/04; an English summary of the decision can be found at 
<www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/K_15_04_GB.pdf>. 
62 Para. 10 of the English summary of judgment K15/04, supra n. 61. 
63 Ibid., para. 1. 
64 Judgment in Case K 18/04, supra n. 19. 
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formulate and implement monetary policy. This claim was rejected because Article 
105 EC, which deals with these matters, is not of a self-executing nature. 
Importantly for our purposes, the Court said that once Poland adopts the common 
currency in the future, a decision might be required to amend the Polish 
Constitution in this respect. Another interesting point to note was that the claimants 
also raised the issue of the constitutionality of the potential future introduction 
of same-sex marriages, which has generated much controversy in this strongly 
Catholic country. According to Article 18 of the Polish Constitution, marriage is 
a union between a man and woman. The Tribunal responded that Article 13 EC 
in the current wording does not concern the institution of marriage as such; any 
future change in this respect would once again require an amendment of the 
Polish Constitution. 
In this judgment, the Tribunal also made a strong statement about the supremacy 
of the Polish Constitution, which has become the best-known part of the 
judgment. However, it is important to underline the fact that the Tribunal rejected 
all the above claims, which does show its efforts to interpret the national 
provisions in an EU-friendly way even though the interpretation of some provisions 
may appear rather stretched to an outside observer. The part of the decision 
that concerns supremacy is closely conditioned by the decision in the European 
Arrest Warrant case, which was decided two weeks before the Accession Treaty 
decision. In order to understand the Tribunal’s statements on supremacy fully, we 
will first examine the European Arrest Warrant decision and then return to the 
supremacy part of the Accession Treaty decision. 
Before doing so, however, the Tribunal’s EU-friendly approach in the case regarding 
the turnout in the accession referendum also warrants a mention. Prior to 
accession, there had been heated debates amongst Polish politicians and scholars 
as to what would happen if the majority of the people were to approve EU accession 
at the referendum, but with the turnout below the required 50%. Parliament 
adopted a statute that allowed it to ratify the accession agreement itself, if the 
turnout remained under this threshold. Some opposition members of the Sejm 
requested the Constitutional Tribunal’s review of the constitutionality of this statute; 
however, the Tribunal upheld the correctness of such a mechanism.65 
In addition, it should be noted that the willingness to interpret national law in 
conformity with Community law was demonstrated by the Polish courts already 
in the pre-accession period. Even though noting that, at the time, Community 
law had no binding force in Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal emphasized that 
Articles 68 and 69 of the Polish Association Agreement66 signified Poland’s obli- 
65 Judgment of 27.05.2003 in Case K11/03; an English summary of the decision can be found 
at <www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/K_11_03_GB.pdf>. 
66 OJ [1993] L 348/1. 
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gation to use ‘its best endeavours to ensure that future legislation is compatible 
with Community legislation’; this resulted ‘in the obligation to interpret the existing 
legislation in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such 
compatibility.’67 
The European Arrest Warrant decision and the Accession Treaty decision 
It is only against the backdrop of the above line of decisions that the Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant68 can be duly understood. The case concerned Article 
55(1) of the Polish Constitution, which provides in an explicit and unconditional 
manner that ‘[t]he extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden’. The 
Polish legislature transposed the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision 
by way of amending in 2004 the 1997 Penal Procedure Code,69 without any 
accompanying amendment of the Constitution. Instead, it decided to deploy a 
terminological distinction between ‘extradition’ and ‘surrender’, implying that th 
asis of an arrest warrant request, was compatible with Article 
55(1) of the Constitution.70 
The Tribunal held that despite numerous important procedural differences 
between the extradition and surrender, the two procedures were very similar in 
substance.71 Thus, according to the judges, the surrender procedure is only a 
variation of extradition, and the prohibition enshrined in Article 55 of the Constitution 
therefore was fully applicable to both procedures. Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Tribunal argued that a pro-European interpretation of this provision 
was not available, because the principles of supremacy and indirect effect do not 
apply to third pillar legislation (the Pupino decision had not yet been delivered by 
the Court of Justice72 ), and in any event the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
has placed limitations to the principle of indirect effect, especially as regards 
67 The decisions are quoted in Kühn, supra n. 46, p. 566; see ibid. for further details. 
68 Judgment in Case P 1/05, supra n. 18. See_ ___ azowski, ‘Constitutional Tribunal on the 
Surrender of Polish Citizens Under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005’, 1 
EuConst (2005) p. 569 at p. 573 et seq.; and K. Kowalik-Ba_czyk, ‘Should We Polish It Up? The 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’, 6 German Law Journal 
(2005), p. 1355. 
69 Act amending the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Minor Offences Code [Ustawa 
z dnia 18 marca 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks karny, ustawy – Kodeks post_powania karnego 
oraz ustawy – Kodeks wykrocze_], Dziennik Ustaw [2004] No. 69 Item 626. 
70 For information on the factual background, see  azowski, supra n. 68, p. 573 et seq. 
71 Ibid., p. 574 et seq. 
72 See infra n. 74 and the accompanying text. 
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aggravating criminal liability.73 As a consequence, the Tribunal declared the implementing 
provision in the Penal Procedure Act unconstitutional. However, the 
Tribunal did not stop extradition, granting instead an 18-month transitional period 
to Parliament, during which the Constitution was to be amended and the 
surrender of the Polish nationals was to continue. 
Although this case concerns the third pillar, where EU law does not enjoy 
supremacy, the judgment has been regarded as sitting somewhat uneasily with the 
Pupino judgment that was delivered shortly afterwards by the European Court of 
Justice.74 According to Pupino, the obligation of loyal co-operation under Article 
10 of the EC Treaty, and the principle of indirect effect, also do apply to the third 
pillar; the Polish European Arrest Warrant decision had excluded indirect effect in 
this domain. However, these judgments could nonetheless be regarded as compatible 
with each other, given that the Pupino judgment places certain limits to indirect 
effect, including the rule that indirect effect should not lead to contra legem 
interpretation. Indeed, the Constitutional Tribunal was not able to interpret the 
Polish Constitution in the light of the Framework Decision without going contra 
legem, and it therefore appears to have been permissible to grant priority to the 
Polish Constitution. 
In any event, the 18-month transitional period testifies that the Tribunal essentially 
sought to ensure an EU-friendly, pragmatic approach,75 especially if considered 
in the light of the Tribunal’s previous case-law. Indeed, the Tribunal emphasized 
that the Polish legislature should ‘give the highest priority’ to ensuring the functioning 
of the European Arrest Warrant system.76 Furthermore, the Tribunal clearly 
had no room to manoeuvre, given the explicit prohibition of extradition in the 
Constitution. As seen above, other provisions allowed a certain measure of interpretation, 
and were indeed interpreted by the Tribunal either as compatible with 
Community law (e.g., provisions on the voting rights) or requiring amendment 
in a more distant future (e.g. provisions on the Central Bank in case of adoption 
of the common currency). However, Article 55(1), formulated as a rule rather 
than a principle,77 left the Court’s hands tied, with the absence of any room to 
manoeuvre. 
The Polish decision can be further contextualised by comparing it with the 
decisions of the constitutional courts of some other member states, which have 
73 See, e.g., ECJ, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen, [1987] ECR I-3969. 
74 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285. For discussion, 
see  _!__"___supra n. 68, p. 578 et seq. 
75 For a similar conclusion, see also_ _!__"___supra n. 68__.__3-*0______"&4_5_!_"__supra n. 
68, p. 1360; J. Komárek, ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual 
Principles in Disharmony’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/05 (2005) available at <www.jean 
monnetprogram.org>, p. 13-14; Kühn, supra n. 56. 
76 Para. 17 of the English summary of the judgment in Case P 1/05, supra n. 18. 
77 See on this Komárek, supra n. 75, p. 12. 
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faced equally controversial issues and asserted their prerogatives with regard to the 
third pillar. Indeed, the Cypriot Supreme Court annulled in November 2005 the 
national implementing law on the basis of a reasoning that closely followed the 
Polish European Arrest Warrant judgment.78 In Germany, the Constitutional Court 
declared in July 2005 that a national law implementing the European Arrest Warrant 
was unconstitutional, for the reason that the law had not exhausted the margins 
afforded by the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, in 
such a way as to afford the highest possible consideration to the protection of 
fundamental rights.79 Indeed, Jan Komárek has pointed out that the Polish Tribunal 
acted in a much more pro-European way than its German counterpart: first, 
the latter was not forced to decide on an explicit conflict between the German 
Basic Law and a provision of European Union law; and secondly, while the Polish 
Tribunal used all its powers to avoid the negative consequences of such a conflict, 
the German Court was not quite so careful about the consequences of its judgment 
for the European legal order.80 Cases concerning an alleged conflict between 
national constitutions and obligations arising from the framework decision 
also have been brought before the Spanish81 and Czech Constitutional Courts.82 
In addition, the Court of Justice has been seized with a question on the validity of 
the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision itself: the Belgian Cour 
d’Arbitrage made a preliminary reference concerning the legal basis of the framework 
decision and the compatibility of the abolition of the dual criminality rule 
with fundamental rights.83 
Against the above background, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal went on to 
emphasize that there are limits to interpretation in the above-mentioned Accession 
Treaty decision that followed two weeks later.84 In this decision, the Tribunal 
78 Judgment of 7.11.2005, Ap. No. 294/2005, English summary on file with the author. 
79 Judgment of 18.07.2005, 2 BvR 2236/04. For a summary in English, see Press Release No. 
64/2005 of 18 July 2005, at the Court’s website <www.bverfg.de/bverfg_cgi/pressemitteilungen/ 
frames/bvg05-064e>. See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional 
Court on the European Arrest Warrant’, 2 EuConst (2006) p. 209-226. 
80 Komárek, supra n. 75, p. 5 and 14; see also Kühn, supra n. 56. 
81 Cases No. RA 3865-2004, RA 3865-2004, RA 4760-2004, RA 3988-2005 and RA 3988- 
2005. 
82 Case No. Pl. ÚS 66/04. The Czech Constitutional Court decided the case on 3 May 2006, 
finding that Article 14(4) of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights, which prohibits forcing 
Czech citizens to leave their homeland, does not preclude a temporary surrender of Czech citizens 
under the European Arrest Warrant, when interpreting the provision in conformity with European 
Union obligations. 
83 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, OJ [2005] C 271/14, 29.10.2005. 
84 Judgment in Case K 18/04, supra n. 19. See also on this judgment the case note by A.  azowski 
‘Poland. Constitutional Tribunal on Conformity of the Accession Treaty with the Polish Constitution’ 
in this issue of EuConst. 
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began by first reiterating the requirement ‘to respect and be sympathetically predisposed 
towards appropriately shaped regulations of international law binding 
upon the Republic of Poland’, in line with Article 9 of the Constitution.85 Indeed, 
the Tribunal developed a version of the pluralist approach to the relations 
between Community and national law, stating that unlike traditional dualism 
and monism, Community law created a new situation ‘wherein, within each Member 
State, autonomous legal orders co-exist and are simultaneously operative.’86 It 
also underscored the assumption of mutual loyalty between the EC/EU institutions 
and the member states, which creates ‘a duty for the Member States to show 
the highest standard of respect for Community norms’, but also ‘a duty for the 
Court of Justice to be sympathetically disposed towards the national legal systems.’ 
87 
However, it then continued by stating that under the explicit wording of Article 
8(1) of the Polish Constitution, the Constitution remains supreme, and there 
are limits to interpreting the domestic law in a manner that is sympathetic to 
European law.88 In certain circumstances, an irreconcilable inconsistency may 
emerge between a constitutional norm and a Community norm, which cannot be 
eliminated by means of interpretation.89 Such cases may not lead to the constitutional 
norm losing its binding force (e.g., as regards norms protecting fundamental 
rights) or retaining its application only in areas which are outside the scope of 
Community law. In case of such explicit conflicts, Parliament has to decide the 
appropriate manner of resolving the inconsistency, with three options being at its 
disposal: amendment of the Constitution, renegotiation of the EU measure, or, 
ultimately, Poland’s withdrawal from the Union.90 As an aside, it should be noted 
that similarly to the constitutional decisions of some older member states, the 
Tribunal stated that the member states maintain the right to assess whether or 
not, in issuing particular legal provisions, the Community (Union) legislative organs 
acted within the delegated competences. The Tribunal also warned the Court 
of Justice that the latter’s interpretation of Community law should stay within the 
scope of competences delegated to the Communities by the member states. In 
addition, it clarified the limits to the delegation of powers to the Union, stating 
that Articles 90(1) and 91(3) of the Polish Constitution do not permit delegation 
to go as far as to bring about the inability of the Republic of Poland to continue 
functioning as a sovereign and democratic State. 
85 Para. 10 of the English summary of Judgment in Case K 18/04, supra n. 19. 
86 Ibid., para. 12. 
87 Ibid., para. 16. 
88 Ibid., para. 14. 
89 Ibid., para. 13. 
90 Ibid. 
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The European Arrest Warrant decision brings us to the issue of the importance 
for the other institutional actors to take their role in the ‘co-operative constitutionalism’ 
seriously: since there were genuine limits to interpretation, the Tribunal 
gave a clear message to Parliament to amend the Constitution. As Komárek puts 
it, 
the question will shift from who (…) the final arbiter in the EU legal order is (…) 
to what the limits of law are. In other words, we will have to ask different questions: 
to what extent the conflict can be decided by the courts (and by their interpretation 
of law) and what should be left to the other constitutional discourse 
actors, these actors being not only politicians, but also the legal/constitutional 
doctrine and the public at large.91 
Indeed, several other new member states had amended their constitutions in order 
to accommodate the European Arrest Warrant system, including Slovenia and 
Latvia;92 one of the most recent countries to do so was an accession country, 
Bulgaria.93 In a follow-up to the European Arrest Warrant judgment, the Polish 
President presented a bill on revision of Article 55 of the Polish Constitution, 
according to which the extradition ban is maintained, subject however to exceptions 
set forth in international treaties; the amendment was adopted in autumn 
2006. We will return to the issue of the parliaments’ role in the ‘co-operative 
constitutionalism’ throughout the remainder of this article. 
Cases contesting the procedure of amending the constitutions 
for Union membership 
Besides by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the adequacy of the constitutional 
amendments for Union membership was also addressed by the highest courts in 
Estonia and Latvia, where not only the substance of the constitutional provisions 
but also the very mode of constitutional amendment had been contested. The 
subsequent sub-sections show that whilst these cases appear to have been brought 
on the basis of legitimate national constitutional grounds, the judgments reflect 
pragmatic efforts of the judges of these very small member states not to ‘rock the 
boat’, given their new role as European as well as national judges. As with the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Estonia delivered a message 
91 Komárek, supra n. 75, p. 25. 
92 For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 67 et seq. 
93 See A.  azowski and S. Yosifova, ‘Bulgaria’, in S. Blockmans and A.  azowski (eds.), The 
European Union and its Neighbours. A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership 
and Integration (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006). 
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to the national parliament on the need for some adjustments in the legislative 
activity in the context of Union membership. 
Estonia 
As with Poland, there had been calls from various quarters in Estonia to amend 
certain provisions of the national constitution prior to accession. These included 
Article 1 of the Constitution, which declares the eternity and inalienability of 
Estonia’s sovereignty and independence, Article 48, which entitles only Estonian 
citizens to belong to political parties, and Article 111, according to which the 
Bank of Estonia has the exclusive right to emit Estonia’s currency. However, due 
to low public support for accession in the years preceding the accession referendum, 
and the extremely arduous constitutional amendment procedure, the Constitution 
was, strictly speaking, not amended but ‘supplemented’ instead by an 
independently standing Act Supplementing the Constitution94 (hereinafter the 
‘Supplementing Act’). In a laconic wording, it authorizes Estonia’s membership of 
the European Union (Article 1), with the Constitution being ‘applied, taking into 
consideration the rights and obligations deriving from the Accession Treaty’ (Article 
2). The Act was approved by referendum on 14 September 2003, where two 
referendums – on accession and on the ‘supplementing’ of the Constitution – 
were fused into one, following an amendment to the Referendum Act. 
A number of constitutional complaints were brought to the Constitutional 
Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, both with regard to the mode of the 
constitutional revision as well as substantive conflicts with Community law. As 
regards the mode of constitutional revision, in total nine cases were brought to the 
Supreme Court after the accession referendum.95 In essence, the following claims 
were made: (a) the Constitution only allows ‘amendment’ of its text, and not its 
‘supplementing’ by an independently standing act; (b) it was impossible to retain 
the ‘eternal and inalienable independence’ (Article 1 of the Constitution), while 
transferring part of it to the European Union, with the referendum question hence 
containing two mutually exclusive parts; (c) ratification of the Accession Treaty 
was unconstitutional as it should have been preceded by amending Article 1 of 
the Constitution (which in turn requires a referendum); and (d) the new type of 
referendum was incompatible with the Constitution and the Referendum Act. All 
claims were rejected by the Constitutional Review Chamber on procedural grounds. 
As regards substantive conflicts with Community law, the Constitutional Review 
Chamber was seized in April 2005 with a case regarding the electoral rights 
94 RT I [Riigi Teataja – Official Gazette] 2003, 64, 429. 
95 E.g., Decision No. 3-4-1-11-03 of 24.09.2003, Vilu and Estonian Voters Union, and Decision 
No. 3-4-1-12-03 of 29.09.2003, Kulbok, available at <www.nc.ee>. 
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of Union citizens.96 In this case, the Chancellor of Justice97 claimed that a provision 
of the Political Parties Act,98 which provides that only an Estonian citizen 
may be a member of a political party, was unconstitutional, when reading the 
above-mentioned Article 48 of the Constitution together with the Supplementing 
Act, as well as being in conflict with Article 19 EC Treaty.99 That is because 
the contested provision would not ensure, in effect, equal opportunities for a 
Union citizen who stands as a candidate in local elections. The petition was dismissed 
on procedural grounds: no legal basis existed for declaring a national law 
invalid in abstracto on the ground of a conflict with Community law. Despite the 
applicant’s reference to constitutional norms, the Court found that the provision 
had, in essence, been contested on the basis of incompatibility with Community 
law. In addition, the Court pointed out, with reference to the Court of Justice’s 
decision in IN.CO.GE.’90,100 that a national act which conflicts with Community 
law could simply be set aside in a concrete dispute. The Supreme Court’s 
decision was criticised in a dissenting opinion, where it was argued that the Court 
should have requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the interpretation 
of Article 19 EC Treaty, as to whether this Article includes the right to 
belong to political parties. The dissenting opinion also expressed regret that the 
Estonian highest court had not taken the opportunity to explain the meaning and 
implications of the Supplementing Act, and, in doing so, failed to enhance legal 
certainty. 
The Supreme Court’s decision appears to convey uneasiness with regard to the 
meaning and place of the Supplementing Act in the Estonian constitutional order, 
which, at the time of adoption, had evoked considerable controversy amongst 
lawyers.101 It looks as if the judges intentionally refused to take a stance on the 
Act that had been widely perceived as a political compromise to make the accession 
to the European Union possible at the time. As with the Polish European 
Arrest Warrant case, the Constitutional Review Chamber sent a message to Parliament, 
suggesting that the latter might wish to adopt clear legislative provisions on 
this matter. According to the Constitutional Review Chamber: 
96 Decision No. 3-4-1-1-05 of 19 April 2005, available at <www.nc.ee>. 
97 The Chancellor of Justice is an institution resembling an ombudsman; it also has the right to 
initiate constitutional review proceedings in the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. 
98 Political Parties Act, RT I 1994, 40, 654; 2003, 90, 601. 
99 Art. 19 EC provides for the right of Union citizens to vote and stand in European Parliament 
and municipal elections when residing in another member state. 
100 ECJ, Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97, Ministero delle Finanze v. IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl [1998] 
ECR I-6307. 
101 For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 91. 
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The legislat[ure] is competent to decide whether it wants to regulate the procedure 
for declaring invalid Estonian legislation which is in conflict with European 
Union law, just as the legislat[ure] is free to choose whether it will or will not give 
the Chancellor of Justice the right to review the conformity of national legislation 
with European Union law.102 
However, one year later, Parliament expressly requested that the Constitutional 
Chamber clarify the meaning of the Supplementing Act, in relation to the abovementioned 
Article 111 of the Constitution, according to which the Bank of Estonia 
has the exclusive right to issue the Estonian currency. The European 
Commission had earlier called on the Estonian Government to amend the Constitution 
in this respect; however, the Government insisted that Article 111 does 
not constitute an obstacle to adopting the common currency, when read together 
with the Supplementing Act. The Constitutional Chamber indeed upheld this 
view in its opinion of 11 May 2006.103 It found that the Draft Act Amending the 
Bank of Estonia Act, which made preparatory arrangements for the eventual adoption 
of the Euro, was compatible with the Constitution. In addition, the Court 
indeed directly addressed the position of the Supplementing Act in the context of 
supremacy of Community law: it stated that the text of the Constitution should 
be read together with the Supplementing Act, and those parts of the Constitution 
that are incompatible with Community law have to be disapplied. As a matter of 
fact, by virtue of this statement, the Court appears to have granted unconditional 
supremacy to Community law. 
It should be noted that following numerous controversies that have surrounded 
the role of the Supplementing Act in the Estonian constitutional order, an increasing 
number of prominent lawyers and politicians have called for a wider EUrelated 
amendment package to be introduced directly into the text of the 
Constitution, or even the adoption of a new constitution. 
Latvia 
The Latvian Constitutional Court equally had to address cases pertaining to the 
correctness of the mode in which the Constitution was amended in view of EU 
accession, with an equally pragmatic approach taken by the Court. As with Estonia, 
the Latvian Constitution requires a referendum for amending Articles 1 and 
2 on sovereignty and independence. However, due to the concerns similar to those 
in Estonia, the Constitution was amended by parliamentary procedure in May 
2003. The amended Article 68 allows Latvia to delegate a part of its competences 
102 Para. 50, Decision No. 3-4-1-1-05 of 19 April 2005, available at <www.nc.ee>. 
103 Opinion No. 3-4-1-3-06 on the interpretation of Article 111, available at <www.nc.ee>. 
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to international institutions. In addition, a new type of referendum was introduced 
for EU accession: whereas a constitutional amendment referendum requires, 
under Article 79, a minimum turnout of 50%, the new EU-referendum merely 
requires the participation of at least half of the number of the voters who participated 
in the previous parliamentary election, with the majority having to vote in 
favour. 
This resulted in five petitions to the Constitutional Court in November 2003,104 
claiming that Parliament was not authorized to adopt the amendments without a 
prior amendment of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution. The petitions contested 
the constitutionality of both the amendments and the accession referendum as 
well as of the Accession Agreement. The Constitutional Court declared the petitions 
inadmissible, as the applicants had failed to substantiate the violation of 
their fundamental rights under the Constitution. The Court also noted that it is 
for Parliament to choose the constitutional amendment procedure; the Court 
does not have the competence to assess the conformity of one norm of the Constitution 
with another or with the Constitution as a whole. If a norm has been 
incorporated into the Constitution, it is an integral part of it and has a corresponding 
legal force.105 
Towards ‘constitutional amorphousness’? 
The above judgments by the highest courts in Estonia and Latvia, whilst taking a 
favourable approach towards the countries’ participation in the European Union, 
seem to reinforce the concerns that had been voiced earlier about a certain degree 
of devaluation of Central and Eastern European constitutions in the process of 
European integration.106 Constitutions in general have been classified into two 
main types – ‘historic’ and ‘revolutionary’.107 The former, which include, for example, 
the British and Dutch Constitutions, have developed incrementally over a 
long-term period, being non-formalistic and at least as much political in nature as 
legal. By contrast, the latter group of constitutions, which include, for instance, 
those of Germany, Italy, France and Ireland, tend to have their origin in a political 
or social cataclysm, which forms the ‘moving myth’ that inspires the Constitu- 
104 The registration numbers of these cases are 119-123/2003; the decisions of inadmissibility 
are not available in English. The decisions are summarised in A. Endzins, ‘Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Latvia’, in The Position of Constitutional Courts Following Integration into the European 
Union, Proceedings of the Conference held in Bled, Slovenia, 30.09.-02.10.2004, p. 208 at p. 
214-215. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 114 et seq. 
107 See L. Besselink, ‘The Dutch Constitution, the European Constitution and the Referendum 
in the Netherlands’, in Albi and Ziller, supra n. 12, p. 113 et seq. 
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tion; these constitutions constitute the political reality and tend to have a distinctly 
legal character, being enforced by constitutional courts.108 The constitutions 
of Central and Eastern Europe belong to the second group: as a reaction to 
the Communist period marked by nihilism to constitutional rules, they have a 
distinctly legal character, are relatively lengthy and detailed, and their observance 
is rigorously policed by powerful constitutional courts.109 In the process of accession 
to the European Union, the EU-amendments to a number of the constitutions, 
in particular those of Poland and the Baltic states, remained substantially 
and/or procedurally minimalist, whereas equivalent changes in domestic aspects 
of governance would have normally led to corresponding constitutional amendments; 
this prompted the question whether constitutions are still ‘taken seriously’ 
in Central and Eastern European countries.110 As a matter of fact, the issue of a 
‘European deficit’111 has also been raised with regard to the constitutions of a 
number of old member states, where Union membership finds minimal or even 
no mention and the constitutions thus might be gradually becoming somewhat 
obsolete with regard to the actual exercise of powers. In Denmark, where the 
Constitution in 2006 still contains no explicit mention of the European Union, 
and the courts rarely exercise constitutional review, Hjalte Rasmussen has noted a 
trend towards ‘waning constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional amorphousness’.112 
In essence, these very questions were brought to the highest courts of Estonia 
and Latvia in the above cases. However, whilst both the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Supreme Court of Estonia and the Constitutional Court of Latvia have 
applied rigorous standards in ensuring the constitutionality of legal measures in 
their previous case-law, these cases appear to indicate that in the context of Union 
membership, the constitutional review standards may have had to be reassessed to 
some extent, and several constitutional issues of fundamental importance appear 
to have been glossed over by the courts. Admittedly, the courts had very little, if 
any, room to manoeuvre. 
108 Ibid. 
109 This argument has been developed in more detail in Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, 
p. 22 et seq. See also E. Smith, ‘The Constitution as an Instrument of Change: Introduction’, in 
E. Smith (ed.), The Constitution as an Instrument of Change (Stockholm, SNS Förlag 2003), p. 15 et 
seq. 
110 Albi, EU Enlargement, supra n. 15, p. 114 et seq. 
111 B. De Witte, ‘Constitutional Aspects of European Union Membership in the Original Six 
Member States: Model Solutions for the Applicant Countries?’, in A. Kellermann et al. (eds.), EU 
Enlargement. The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2001) p. 73. 
112 H. Rasmussen, ‘Denmark’s Waning Constitutionalism and Article 20 of the Constitution 
on Transfer of Sovereignty’, in Albi and Ziller, supra n. 12, p. 149-156. 
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With the hands of the courts thus being tied by the constraints of Union membership, 
the role of the political institutions, especially parliaments, assumes particular 
importance in terms of exercising self-control and extra prudence when 
drafting constitutional amendments and legislation. If the constitutional culture 
that prevailed prior to accession is to be sustained, the national political institutions 
need to show a higher awareness of, and responsibility to, the norms of the 
national constitutions. Admittedly, this is not an easy task: whereas in France and 
Germany political parties are almost united vis-à-vis European questions, amending 
constitutions in some Central European countries would have to surmount 
considerable hurdles given their polarized political scenes, which include strong 
eurosceptic parties.113 This discussion will be returned to, and expanded on, in 
the final stages of the article, after examining certain difficulties that the courts 
have encountered in the process of implementing Union law. 
The region-wide drama with bitter sugar and troubled legitimate 
expectations 
Overview of national cases and direct actions 
One issue that has made waves in a number of new member states, and which 
might even evoke certain parallels with the Banana saga,114 is the vexed situation 
regarding the protection of fundamental rights and general principles of law in 
the context of implementing Community rules on excess sugar and excess stocks 
of other foodstuffs. Prior to accession, the European Commission adopted two 
regulations obliging the new member states to ensure that, upon entry to the 
Union, their stocks would not exceed the average of the previous years. In November 
2003, Commission Regulation 1972/2003/EC on transitional measures 
regarding trade in agricultural products was adopted,115 followed in January 2004 
by Commission Regulation 60/2004/EC on the sugar sector.116 Both aimed to 
prevent the purchase of these foodstuffs for speculative ends, which could distort 
prices in the common market. Under the regulations, stocks that exceed the permissible 
amount were to be penalised by fines. However, the legislatures of the 
113 I am grateful to Zdenek Kühn for this point; see also Kühn, supra n. 56 
114 See infra n. 156 and the accompanying text. 
115 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1972/2003 of 10.11.2003 on transitional measures to be 
adopted in respect of trade in agricultural products on account of the accession of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, OJ [2003] L 
293/3. 
116 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 60/2004 of 14.01.2004 laying down transitional measures 
in the sugar sector by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, OJ [2004] L 9/8. 
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accession countries found themselves in a difficult position, having to implement 
the European Commission’s requirements in domestic law in a way that would 
respect constitutional rights. This topic will be addressed by first outlining the 
national cases and direct actions. Subsequently, the broader issue of protection of 
fundamental rights in the European Union will be discussed of certain criticisms 
with regard to the Court of Justice granting priority to the common market interests. 
Hungary 
The overview begins with Hungary, where the Constitutional Court on 25 May 
2004 declared a national implementing act unconstitutional.117 On 5 April 2004, 
the Hungarian Parliament had adopted a law ‘On measures concerning agricultural 
surplus stocks’ (hereinafter the Surplus Act), in order to implement the two 
above-mentioned regulations. The President submitted the Act to the Constitutional 
Court for preliminary constitutional review, arguing that the Surplus Act, 
with its envisaged entry into force on 25 May 2004, would have been retroactive 
and hence unconstitutional. Had the President signed the Surplus Act, it would 
have entered into force on 25 May 2004, whilst the obligations defined in the 
Surplus Act would have been effective as of 1 May, the date of the entry to the 
Union. In Hungary, obligations on taxpayers cannot be applied until 45 days after 
promulgation. The Government had hoped to meet this deadline by deploying an 
expedited parliamentary procedure; however, the target date was missed as Parliament 
had failed to reach the required quorum. The Constitutional Court found 
that the Act violated the principle of legal certainty. It referred to its long-standing 
tradition of observing the fundamental constitutional rule that Hungary is a state 
based on the rule of law, which includes the principle of non-retroactivity and the 
granting of a reasonable lead-in time for measures imposing taxation-related obligations. 
In addition, the Surplus Act delegated to the executive the adoption of 
rules defining the subjects who were liable to pay the charge and the method of 
determining the charge; this was found to contradict the constitutional requirement 
that fundamental rights and duties are to be determined by an act of Parliament. 
Importantly, the Court treated the Surplus Act as a domestic act dating 
117 Decision 17/2004 (V.25.) AB. See in more detail Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 351 et seq.; R. Uitz, 
‘EU Law and the Hungarian Constitutional Court: Lessons of the First Post-accesson Encounter’, 
in W. Sadurski et al. (eds.), Après Enlargement: Taking Stock of the Immediate Legal and Political 
Responses to the Accession of Central and Eastern European States to the EU (Florence, European University 
Institute 2006) p. 41-64; J. Czuczai, ‘Hungary’, in A.E. Kellermann et al. (eds.), The Impact 
of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New EU Member States and (Pre-) Candidate Countries. Hopes 
and Fears (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006) p. 343 at p. 350-351. 
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from the pre-accession period, thereby avoiding the issue of supremacy of Community 
law. 
Estonia 
In Estonia, approximately thirty cases were brought to the administrative courts 
with regard to a similar act implementing the above-mentioned Community regulations. 
These cases were resolved in October 2006 by the Supreme Court in a 
case that, in a remarkable expression of judicial inventiveness, stopped the application 
of the problematic provisions whilst escaping any assessment of the constitutionality 
of the implementing act. The cases were prompted by the so-called 
Surplus Stocks Charges Act (hereinafter Surplus Stocks Act),118 which the Estonian 
Parliament adopted virtually at the last minute in an attempt to implement 
the obligations arising from the regulations. The Act was published on 27 April 
2004, and took effect three days later, on 1 May 2004, the date of accession; the 
undertakings thus had effectively just three days to dispose of their sugar stocks. 
Under the Act, fines were imposed subsequently on those undertakings whose 
sugar stocks exceeded the permissible amount. The constitutionality of the Government 
regulations adopted under the Surplus Act, as well as the Act itself, were 
contested on the grounds of the right to property and the principles of nonretroactive 
legislation, legal certainty, legitimate expectations and proportionality. 
The undertakings argued that it would be unconstitutional to be punished retroactively 
for sugar stocks that they obtained prior to 1 May 2004. Under the Estonian 
Constitution alone, these undertakings would have had very strong claims. 
The Supreme Court of Estonia has reiterated these principles on several occasions, 
and it had earlier annulled legislation that changed legal obligations in a 
very short period of time, on the ground of incompatibility with the rule of law. 
However, the courts of first instance found against the undertakings, referring 
to the new constitutional context resulting from Union membership and the 
requirement of supremacy of Community law under the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
case.119 These decisions were based predominantly on the following 
arguments.120 Firstly, although acknowledging that the three-day period was neither 
reasonable nor sufficient for the addressees to learn about their obligations 
and rearrange their activities, the courts did not find the principles of legal certainty 
and legitimate expectations to have been violated. This was because the 
118 RT 2004 I, 30, 203. 
119 See Case 11/70, supra n. 1. 
120 We refer here to Tallinn Administrative Court Decision in Teskatel Ltd. (Judgment No. 3- 
2578/2004 of 17 Oct. 2005). The precise issues and reasoning varied in the large number of other 
decisions. 
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Accession Treaty was concluded already on 16 April 2003 and published in the 
Estonian Official Gazette, plus Article 22 of the Act of Accession121 referred to 
the need to eliminate the surplus stocks. Undertakings were expected to familiarise 
themselves with the legal environment, including the obligations arising under 
the Accession Treaty. Secondly, the courts said that they had no power to undertake 
a final assessment as to whether the Surplus Act violated the invoked general 
principles of law, given that the Act was implementing European Commission 
regulations, the validity of which can be reviewed by the European Court of Justice 
alone. Furthermore, the courts referred to the Weidacher case,122 which had 
addressed similar circumstances upon Austria’s accession to the European Union. 
In Weidacher, an Austrian company that had imported olive oil from Tunisia prior 
to accession went bankrupt because of equivalent fines. A preliminary reference 
was made to the Court of Justice, requesting a review of the relevant Commission 
Regulation on the grounds of the principles of proportionality and legitimate 
expectations. The Court rejected the claim, holding that the Commission has a 
wide margin of discretion within the Common Agricultural Policy, and was entitled, 
under the Austrian Act of Accession, to facilitate the transition by adopting 
the transitional measures. As regards legitimate expectations, the Court held that 
this principle could be invoked as against Community rules only insofar as the 
Community itself had previously created a situation that could give rise to a legitimate 
expectation,123 which had not been the case here. Any normally diligent 
economic operator must have known, since the publication of the Act of Accession 
in the European Union’s Official Journal, that the Commission specifically 
was empowered to adopt such transitional measures, and that there were potential 
repercussions on the surplus stocks built up prior to the publication of the Regulation. 
Based on the Court of Justice’s decision in the Weidacher case, the Estonian 
courts considered it unlikely that the European Court of Justice would take a 
different position with regard to analogous measures applying to the 2004 accession 
states. 
The decisions of the courts of first instance were subsequently appealed, with 
some reaching the Supreme Court of Estonia. On 5 October 2006, in an appeal 
in the Hadleri case,124 the circumstances of which were broadly similar to the case 
outlined in the previous paragraph, the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme 
121 OJ [2003] L 236/33. 
122 ECJ, Case C-179/00 Weidacher v. Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft [2002] ECR 
I-501. 
123 This formula was established, e.g., in Case C-177/90 Kühn v. Landwirtschaftskammer Weser- 
Ems [1992] ECR I-35, para. 14. 
124 Judgment No. 3-3-1-33-06 of 5 Oct. 2006, Hadleri Toidulisandite AS, in Estonian at 
<www.nc.ee>. 
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Court delivered a judgment which, in a surprising move, relieved the undertakings 
from their financial burden, but did so on the grounds of Community law 
rather than on the basis of the national constitution. The Supreme Court began 
by noting that the Surplus Act indeed was adopted with delay and entered into 
force in a hurry, and deemed it incorrect to impose tax obligations by an act 
immediately entering into force upon being adopted and published. Referring to 
an earlier decision from 2004,125 the Court reaffirmed that the principle of legal 
certainty requires that a reasonable time pass between the adoption of important 
legislative changes and their entry into force, to provide the addressees with sufficient 
time to rearrange their activities. However, the Supreme Court continued by 
stating that since the accession process has taken place over several years, a reasonable 
undertaking should have been able to foresee the forthcoming change in the 
legal situation arising from accession and, after Estonia’s signature to the Accession 
Treaty in 2003, the undertaking should have become informed about the 
EC’s 2003 Regulation on surplus stocks. In an interesting twist, the Supreme 
Court then stated that although the fines based on the surplus stocks were, in 
general, foreseeable, the undertakings were not able to foresee the specific rules 
established by the Surplus Act. The specific rules regarding the methodology for 
calculating the fine had not, according to the Court, made use of the margin of 
discretion afforded to the member states under Article 4(2) of the 2003 Regulation, 
in that the single coefficient used for determining the surplus sugar stock, 
applicable to all undertakings, did not take into account the specific circumstances 
of the emergence of the surplus stocks in individual undertakings. This coefficient 
was not fair and just, and it was thus disproportionately onerous for the undertakings. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that no need arose to 
request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, the provision of the Regulation 
being sufficiently clear and unambiguous (acte clair). As a consequence, the 
Supreme Court declared the relevant provisions of the Surplus Stocks Act, and the 
Government regulations adopted under this Act, inapplicable due to their incompatibility 
with Community law. Importantly, the Court drew the legislature’s attention 
to the latter’s power to amend the Surplus Act, by enacting retroactively 
provisions which would hold rules that would be more flexible and advantageous 
for the undertakings. Finally, since the relevant provisions of the Surplus Act were 
found inapplicable due to their incompatibility with Community law, the Court 
eschewed any review of their compatibility with the Constitution of Estonia. As a 
result of this judgment, the other pending cases were discontinued. 
It is by no means clear, though, that the story will end here. As will be seen 
below, direct actions have been brought against the relevant EC regulations by the 
Estonian, Polish and Cypriot Governments. Indeed, the Supreme Court in the 
125 Judgment No. 3-4-1-20-04 of 2 Dec. 2004, in Estonian at <www.nc.ee>. 
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above-mentioned decision noted the existence of these actions, but did not address 
their significance, as this issue had not been raised by the appellant. Further, 
should the Estonian legislature follow up the Supreme Court’s decision and retroactively 
establish a coefficient that is more favourable to the undertakings, it is 
conceivable that the latter nonetheless might bring new court proceedings, resubmitting 
the arguments concerning the (un)constitutionality of the Surplus Act. 
There is also a possibility of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on the 
validity of the relevant EC regulations; indeed, it is striking that none of the lower 
courts did so in the above-mentioned cases. 
The Czech Republic 
Sugar was also the issue in one of the first decisions relating to European Union 
membership of the Czech Constitutional Court, albeit concerning production 
quotas instead of surplus stocks. During the pre-accession period, the Czech Constitutional 
Court had, on several occasions, declared unconstitutional successive 
Government regulations, which were issued to establish the rules for determining 
sugar production quotas, in anticipation of the adoption of the acquis on the 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
However, in a post-accession decision of 8 March 2006,126 the Court decided 
to disregard in part its previous case-law, reasoning that upon the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the European Union, a fundamental change had occurred within the 
Czech legal order. Although the norms of the Czech Republic’s constitutional 
order continued to be the Constitutional Court’s referential framework even after 
accession on 1 May 2004, the Court said that it cannot overlook the impact of 
Community law on the formation, application, and interpretation of national 
law. The Court explicitly mentioned the principle of constitutional self-restraint, 
and that it now interprets constitutional law in a way that takes into account the 
principles arising from Community law. 
Interestingly, it noted that the current standard within the Community for the 
protection of fundamental rights could not give rise to the assumption that this 
standard is lower than the protection accorded in the Czech Republic. The Court 
did declare the relevant law invalid, but – as with the above Estonian case – on the 
grounds of Community law instead of the national Constitution.127 It found that 
the Government had acted ultra vires, as it had exercised an authority which had 
been transferred to the Community bodies; due to the direct applicability of the 
relevant EC regulation, the Czech Government was no longer entitled to adopt 
the national implementing act. 
126 Pl. ÚS 50/04, 08.03.2006; English translation on file with the author. 
127 On the ground of acte clair, it was not considered necessary to request a preliminary reference 
from the European Court of Justice. 
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In this decision, the Czech Constitutional Court also articulated its view on 
supremacy. It started by referring to the relevant decisions of the constitutional 
courts of Germany, Italy and other member states, mentioning that they have 
never entirely acquiesced to the doctrine of absolute precedence of Community 
law. In the Czech Republic, a part of the state’s powers were conferred on the 
European Union under Article 10a of the Czech Constitution. This Article operates 
in a twofold way: it forms the normative basis for the transfer of powers, and 
simultaneously opens up the national legal order to the operation of Community 
law within the Czech legal order. However, the conferral of powers is conditional: 
the Czech Republic remains the original bearer of sovereignty under Article 1 of 
the Constitution, according to which the Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary 
and democratic state governed by the rule of law, founded on respect for fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The delegation of a part of the powers of national 
bodies may persist only so long as these powers are exercised in a manner that is 
compatible with the preservation of the foundations of state sovereignty and does 
not threaten the very essence of the substantive law-based state. Should one of 
these conditions cease to be met, the Constitutional Court would be called upon 
to protect constitutionalism, and it would be necessary to insist that these powers 
be returned to the Czech Republic. Thus, the Czech Constitutional Court effectively 
rephrased the famous Solange II decision.128 
Direct actions and WTO rules 
In the meantime, the Polish, Cypriot and Estonian Governments have brought 
direct actions to the Court of First Instance in a series of separate cases. In June 
2004, Poland submitted two actions against the European Commission for annulment 
of Commission Regulations 1972/2003/EC129 and 60/2004/EC.130 The 
grounds of the Polish actions included breach of the principle of free movement 
of goods, lack of competence to adopt the regulations, abuse of powers by the 
European Commission, and infringement of the principles of non-discrimination 
and protection of legitimate expectations. 
The Estonian Government brought an action in August 2005 against Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 832/2005,131 which lays down the rules on the 
128 Kühn, supra n. 56. 
129 Action brought on 28.06.2004, Poland v. EC Commission (Case T-257/04), OJ [2004] C 
251/20. 
130 Action brought on 28.06.2004, Poland v. EC Commission (Case T-258/04), OJ [2004] C 
251/21. 
131 Regulation (EC) No. 832/2005 of 31.05.2005 on the determination of surplus quantities of 
sugar, isoglucose and fructose for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. OJ [2005] L 138/3. 
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determination of surplus sugar quantities in the new member states.132 Besides 
claiming the breach of essential procedural requirements and of the principle of 
non-discrimination, the Estonian Government focused especially on the dramatically 
large fine of approximately 45 million Euros that the European Commission 
is expected to impose upon Estonia. The fine would include the sugar accumulated 
by private households, which amounts to approximately half of the total 
surplus sugar in the country. Ahead of accession, there was a ‘sugar panic’ in Estonia, 
as the price of sugar was expected to increase after accession, and people 
accumulated large quantities of sugar to continue making delightful home-made 
jams in the forthcoming years. Not surprisingly, such a peculiar and indeed baffling 
fine has caused major resentment towards the European Union amongst the 
population,133 especially given that the state budget priorities lie in improving 
infrastructure, education and health services, in a quest to rectify the damage 
inflicted on the country by the Soviet occupation and catch up with the old member 
states. According to the Estonian Government’s arguments in the direct action, 
imposing a fine on the sugar accumulated by private households goes against 
sound administration, the right to property of private households (as well as of 
undertakings),134 and the principles of proportionality and legitimate expectations. 
One wonders whether the sugar drama might acquire the dimensions comparable 
to the Banana saga in the 1990s. Indeed, to complicate the matter further, 
the appellate body of the WTO adopted a decision in April 2005 according to 
which the European Union’s sugar production subsidies and restrictions on imports 
are illegal.135 This also concerns the rules under which Estonia is being 
fined; indeed, in June 2005, the agriculture commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel 
announced a sharp review of the Union’s nearly 40-year-old sugar regime.136 
Comment: Between a rock and a hard place 
The Hungarian decision, which was outlined above and in which a national implementing 
act was declared unconstitutional, has sparked considerable controversy, 
and will be the main basis for our analysis below. Whilst the Estonian and Czech 
132 Action brought on 25.08.2005, Estonia v. EC Commission (Case T-324/05), OJ [2005] 
C 271/24. 
133 As a matter of fact, a nationwide campaign was organised to bring thousands of jars of 
home-made jam to Brussels, but this did not succeed on the planned scale, as EU legislation does 
not allow distribution of home-made jam to the public. 
134 This, in essence, appears to indicate the Government’s support to the claims of the companies 
in the above-mentioned national cases. 
135 ‘EU loses battle in WTO over sugar support’, Eubusiness, 28.04.2005, <www.eubusiness.com>. 
136 ‘EU announces overhaul of sugar subsidies’, Euobserver, 22.06.2005, <www.euobserver.com>. 
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highest courts demonstrated judicial self-restraint and resourcefulness, escaping 
the assessment of constitutionality by annulling the problematic provisions on 
the ground of Community law instead, a number of remarks are equally relevant 
to the broader issues raised by these cases. 
There have been two readings of the Hungarian decision. On the first reading, 
the Hungarian Court failed to understand properly its role in the application of 
Community law and was unwilling to participate in the European learning process, 
presenting itself as the ultimate guarantor of constitutionality.137 Although 
the Court stated that its decision did not concern the validity or the interpretation 
of Community law, the Surplus Act did largely replicate the provisions of the two 
EC regulations. With supremacy of Community law thus having been at stake, 
the Hungarian Court did have alternative options at its disposal to avoid a conflict 
with Community law, which it chose not to deploy.138 For instance, it could 
have construed the charge as not being a tax under Hungarian law, but as a ‘Community 
charge’ based on the Accession Treaty and hence a new category of obligations 
under Community law. Alternatively, by considering the matter to be one of 
Community law, the Court could have made use of the acte clair doctrine by 
reference to the Weidacher case.139 
The second reading, which appears to be better suited, is that the Constitutional 
Court avoided taking a stand directly on the supremacy of Community 
law, showing judicial deference or self-restraint in a way which is not that different 
from other European fora of constitutional review, in seeking to leave Community 
law undisturbed to the farthest possible extent.140 The Court did so by finding 
that the Surplus Act was a domestic act adopted prior to EU accession, when 
Community law still qualified as foreign law in Hungary. The Court could disregard 
the Community regulations and their direct effect within the Community 
legal system simply because this was a legal realm which did not apply to Hungary 
at the time when the material facts of the case occurred. This is in line with 
Hungary’s dualist stance to international law.141 
The second reading sits well with our analysis of the Polish European Arrest 
Warrant decision, in that the Hungarian Court equally appears to have sent a 
message to the national parliament. Andras Sajó has pointed out that, on this 
second reading, the Constitutional Court: 
137 This view is represented, e.g., by Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 351 et seq. See also Czuczai, supra n. 
117, p. 351. 
138 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 362 et seq. 
139 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 358 and 365. 
140 This view is represented by Uitz, supra n. 117, p. 44 et seq. 
141 Ibid., p. 48-50. 
 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘European Constitutional Law Review, 3: pp 25–67’ 
- 33 - 
 
 
sent a strong message to the political branch about the needs of a new attitude 
towards law-making and legislation. The message indicates that law-making 
should be fully responsive to the new requirements of European [Union] membership 
and European law should be moved out of ordinary politics. This means 
that government bureaucracies should be much more diligent and the opposition 
much more co-operative.142 
In other words, if necessary for the purposes of European Union law, parliamentarians 
may have to display extra unity and willingness to compromise in areas 
that concern Union law, such as imposing relevant tax obligations, in order to 
ensure that the acts implementing Union law are adopted in a manner that is 
compatible with the national constitutional requirements. In sending such a message, 
the Court sought to countenance the risk that ‘the government bureaucracy 
[would] use the pressures of accession and [EC] law supremacy to deprive Hungarian 
citizens of the protection against bureaucratic sloppiness and the resulting 
disregard of the rule of law.’143 Besides the need to improve legislation, the Court’s 
message implicitly also concerned the insufficiency of the constitutional amendments. 
Although Hungary adopted a more extensive package of EU-amendments 
than several other Central and Eastern accession countries, the amendments failed 
to take a position on the supremacy of Community law, even though Hungary 
follows a strong dualist tradition in its stance on international law.144 In addition, 
although the Government had been aware of the difficulty of transplanting Community 
law, it did not command, at the time, the necessary super-majority required 
to introduce a constitutional amendment that would modify, for EU-related 
matters, the current rules according to which Parliament has an exclusive regulatory 
competence in matters that affect fundamental rights and obligations.145 
The sugar cases raise important issues regarding a certain degree of downward 
adjustment in the national administrative cultures and in the level of protection 
of fundamental rights in the process of implementing Union law. Although all 
three courts avoided any assessment of Community rules on the ground of the 
fundamental rights contained in the national constitutions – doing so either by 
regarding the implementing measure as a pre-accession measure (Hungarian Constitutional 
Court) or annulling/disapplying it on the ground of Community law 
itself (Estonian Supreme Court and the Czech Constitutional Court) – the cases 
indicate that had such avenues not been available, the previous level of protection 
would have had to be downgraded to some extent to ensure supremacy of Com- 
142 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 368-369. 
143 Ibid., p. 371. 
144 Ibid., p. 353. 
145 Ibid., p. 361. 
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munity law. Indeed, the Estonian courts and, to some extent, the Czech Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that as regards the protection of fundamental rights, 
the novel context of Union membership requires a revision of their previous approach 
with its somewhat higher level of protection. As Andras Sajó has commented, 
co-operation at Union level involves trade-offs; the concerns of uniform 
application and effectiveness of Community law ‘seem to have forced certain countries 
to give up elements of their rule of law, e.g. legal certainty in administrative 
procedure, and even national versions of fundamental rights.’146 
Such concerns have also surfaced in older member states. Elies Steyger has 
noted that the obligation of loyal implementation, which applies even if the governments 
are in doubt about the validity of an EU decision concerned and even 
where it would be against the principles of proper administration or procedural 
rules, has sometimes put the national administrations in ‘a nasty position’:147 
On the one hand, they have to implement Community decisions, which may violate 
every principle of proper administration they traditionally value and are used 
to adhere to, even if they legitimately question the validity of the decision concerned. 
On the other hand, they are not able to save their relationship with the 
individual concerned, by applying their national principles of good administration 
once they in their turn impose the obligations [… under the EU] decision onto 
individuals.148 
According to Steyger, in the Netherlands, this has led to situations such as the 
Affish case where the Dutch Government did not defend the decision issued on 
the basis of a Commission decision, and effectively invited the applicant to request 
a preliminary ruling.149 In Finland, as Tuomas Ojanen has pointed out, 
constitutional rights to some extent qualify the primacy of Community law over 
Finnish law, and the Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish Parliament 
has stressed that the domestic implementation of European Union law may not 
weaken the level of national protection of constitutional rights.150 Although, in 
most cases, the Committee has found a way to blunt the edge of any open conflict 
between constitutional rights and European Union law, occasionally, however, 
the constitutional premise not to compromise the domestic standard of protec- 
146 Ibid., p. 367-368. 
147 E. Steyger, National Traditions and European Community Law: Margarine and Marriage 
(Aldershot, Ashgate 1997) p. 190 et seq. 
148 Ibid., p. 191. 
149 ECJ, Case C-183/95 Affish BV v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I- 
4315; see E. Steyger, supra n. 147, p. 192. 
150 T. Ojanen, ‘The Impact of EU Membership on Finnish Constitutional Law’, 10 European 
Public Law (2004) p. 542. 
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tion of constitutional rights in the implementation of Union law has compromised 
the maximum implementation of Union law.151 
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Justice developed the concept of protection 
of fundamental rights primarily as a response to national challenges to supremacy. 
However, concerns continue being voiced about the level of the protection, with 
individual rights rarely being given priority over common market interests.152 In 
1992, Coppel and O’Neill argued in a well-known article that the Court’s high 
rhetoric of human rights protection has merely been instrumental for the Court’s 
expansion of the scope and impact of European law, with fundamental rights not 
being taken seriously.153 Furthermore, a more lenient standard of review appears 
to be applied for assessing the Community acts in comparison with that applied 
to the member states.154 At the time, this argument was vehemently rejected by 
leading EU lawyers.155 However, such concerns resurfaced in the course of the 
Banana saga, where German courts voiced their open distrust with regard to the 
Community institutions and the protection of fundamental rights offered by the 
Court of Justice to individuals156 (the German Constitutional Court, however, 
ultimately declared an appeal inadmissible on the ground that no deterioration 
had occurred in the general standards of protection in the European Union). The 
European Court of Justice’s decision in the Banana case157 was widely considered 
to prove the deficiency of the Court’s fundamental rights review, which falls short 
of the level of protection mandated by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the constitutions of the member states, in being too lenient with regard 
to Community measures.158 In an authoritative criticism, a former judge in 
the Court of Justice, Ulrich Everling, expressing his ‘perplexity’ at the Court’s 
 
151 Ibid, p. 545. 
152 For discussion of relevant literature, see Douglas-Scott, supra n. 27, p. 460-461 and 454- 
458; Herdegen, supra n. 27, p. 10-12. 
153 J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, 29 
CMLRev. (1992) p. 670 et seq. and 692. 
154 Ibid, p. 684. 
155 E.g., J. Weiler and N. Lockhart, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” Seriously: The European Court 
and Its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’, 32 CMLRev. (1995) p. 51 and 579. 
156 See, e.g., U. Everling, ‘Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement of the Court 
of Justice and National Courts’, 33 CMLRev. (1996) p. 401; N. Reich, ‘Judge-made Europe à la 
Carte: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between European and German Constitutional Law 
Provoked by the Banana Litigation’, European Journal of International Law (1996) p. 103; Herdegen, 
supra n. 27, p. 11. 
157 ECJ, Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973. 
158 Herdegen, supra n. 27, p. 11 and 21; B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European 
Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999), at p. 878-879. 
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judgment, which in his view granted Community institutions carte blanche and 
reduced judicial control to a minimum,159 restated Coppel and O’Neill’s question 
of whether the Court takes fundamental rights seriously.160 
Besides the priority being granted to common market interests, the divergence 
in human rights protection at national and EU levels has a number of additional 
facets.161 To begin with, the fundamental rights involved are not protected directly 
as such, but only indirectly as unwritten general principles. Whilst rights 
can be defined very precisely, principles are relatively vague and uncertain in scope, 
and the courts thus cannot grant to these the same protection.162 A general principle 
must inherently suffer exceptions, whereas a well-defined fundamental right 
may be restricted only under specified circumstances.163 To bring a concrete example 
from a national constitutional context, it is argued that in Finland the 
standard of protection of constitutional rights is higher than the fundamental 
rights standard under European Union law, for the reason that the criteria for the 
limitations on constitutional rights are nuanced and refined more than those for 
the limitations on European Union fundamental rights.164 Indeed the domestic 
test for the limitations on constitutional rights consists of seven distinct criteria 
which must be simultaneously fulfilled: (i) the limitation must be based on an Act 
of Parliament; (ii) the limitation must be precise and defined in sufficient detail; 
(iii) the grounds for the limitation must be legitimate in the context of the system 
of constitutional rights and the limitation must be necessary for the achievement 
of this legitimate aim; (iv) a limitation going into the core of a constitutional right 
cannot be laid down by an ordinary Act of Parliament; (v) the limitation must 
adhere to the principle of proportionality; (vi) due protection under the law must 
be arranged when a constitutional right is being limited; and (vii) the limitation 
must be in accordance with the international human rights obligations.165 
Another aspect of the divergence lies in the fact that the rights identified as 
being part of the unwritten European catalogue do not include all the rights protected 
at national constitutional level.166 To bring another example from Finland, 
the country’s constitution sets out a range of economic, social and cultural rights, 
in addition to the more traditional civil and political rights, and most rights are 
 
159 Everling, supra n. 156, p. 413 and 419. 
160 Ibid., p. 419. 
161 See L. Besselink, ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism 
and Subsidiarity in the European Union’, 35 CMLRev. (1998), p. 634 et seq.; De Witte, supra n. 
158, p. 879. 
162 Besselink, supra n. 161, p. 634 et seq. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ojanen, supra n. 150, p. 543-544, with references to Finnish literature. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Besselink, supra n. 161, p. 634 et seq.; De Witte, supra n. 158, p. 879. 
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granted to everyone.167 In addition, the Finnish level of protection of social rights 
tends to be higher than in the rest of Europe.168 
A further weakness in the European Union’s human rights protection is that 
overall few human rights cases reach the Court of Justice in the first place.169 The 
reasons appear to be that many potential litigants are discouraged by the lack of 
sympathy displayed by the Court of Justice towards arguments based on fundamental 
rights, by the lack of visibility of Community fundamental rights due to 
their unwritten state as general principles of law, and by the narrow standing rules 
for individual complaints under Article 230 EC Treaty.170 
Indeed, it appears that the cases where the Court of Justice found that the 
Community breached fundamental rights are rare.171 Perhaps the very principle 
of legitimate expectations, which is central to some of the case-law discussed above, 
could serve as an illustration of the level of review by the Court. It appears that the 
overwhelming majority of claims based on the breach of the principle of legitimate 
expectations has been rejected by the Court; the Court expects a prudent 
and well-informed trader to foresee changes in the law.172 As regards the principle 
of proportionality, it has been commented that the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance appear to continue their earlier approach of being broadly protective 
of general Community legislative policy, whilst, on the other hand, they 
are somewhat readier to declare disproportionate a member state’s legislation that 
infringes the Treaty’s economic freedoms.173 As regards the right to property or 
the freedom to trade, in no case so far has the Court found a violation of this 
right.174 Overall, the Court appears to take a hands-off approach in matters of 
economic regulation, and allows the institutions to enjoy considerable discretion; 
it finds a Community measure to be invalid only where the Community has made 
a manifest error and the institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion. 
 
167 Ojanen, supra n. 150, p. 543. 
168 Ibid. 
169 De Witte, supra n. 158, p. 882-883. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., p. 869. 
172 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999), p. 
169 and 173. For a detailed analysis of the ECJ’s case-law on the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations, see Chapter 6 of the new edition of this book (T. Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2006)) and J. Raitio, The Principle of Legal 
Certainty in EC Law (Dordrecht, Kluwer 2003), Chapter 6. 
173 G. De Burca, ‘Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law’, in Bernitz and 
Nergelius, supra n. 27, p. 98-99. 
174 Tridimas (2006) supra n. 172, p. 315. 
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Such a state of play in the protection of fundamental rights in the European 
Union is particularly ironic as regards the new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe who have accorded a strong protection to constitutional rights as 
a reaction to the Communist period governed by legal nihilism and systematic 
trampling of human rights. As Andras Sajó astutely puts it, ‘[i]t is ironic that in 
the Hungarian case[,] the learning [of “co-operative constitutionalism”] is made 
difficult by a historically determined serious commitment to […] fundamental 
rights.’175 Another aspect of the irony lies, of course, in the marked contrast between 
these post-accession developments and the high rhetoric of human rights 
that marked the pre-accession conditions, which were based on the Copenhagen 
Criteria and led to a careful monitoring exercise by the European Commission in 
its annual reports prior to accession.176 Yet another, and rather more serious, element 
of the irony is that under the recent case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg (Matthews,177 Bosphorus178 ), the member states of 
the European Union may be held jointly liable for human rights violations committed 
by the European Union. 
Europe did not ‘slip on bananas’,179 but might it slip on sugar or indeed another 
element of the Common Agricultural Policy? The mostly neo-liberally oriented 
new member states, who in the past decade underwent painful shock reforms 
in liberalising their economies, and who have engaged in minimising regulatory 
and tax burdens on undertakings, are certainly likely to face uncomfortable issues 
when implementing Common Agricultural Policy measures. This holds especially 
true when it involves sacrificing the fundamental rights of individuals for the sake 
of what is broadly regarded as an utterly bizarre, anachronistic policy. 
‘Co-operative constitutionalism’ in Europe: beyond ‘judicial 
dialogues’ 
The cases considered above demonstrate that it would be over-simplistic or indeed 
inadequate to explain the decisions of the national constitutional courts of 
Central and Eastern European countries as pro- or anti-European. The picture is 
much more complex than that, and the cases show that there are genuine limits to 
EU-friendly interpretation. Therefore, this article will conclude by suggesting that 
two elements should be added to the equation of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’, 
 
175 Sajó, supra n. 14, p. 371. 
176 For a broader analysis of the incoherence in the human rights protection in the European 
Union’s internal and in external policy, see A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p. 6 et seq. and especially Chapter 3, p. 53 et seq. 
177 Matthews v. UK (1999) 28 EHRR 361. 
178 Bosphorus v. Ireland, 45036/98 [2005] ECHR 440. 
179 To borrow the terminology used by Everling, supra n. 156. 
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the first concerning the judicial dialogues, the second the role of political institutions. 
Firstly, as regards the judicial dimension of ‘co-operative constitutionalism’, 
the Polish European Arrest Warrant decision (albeit concerning the third pillar) 
and the Hungarian sugar stocks decision lend support to the need to consider 
further what Mattias Kumm has termed the ‘Pangloss scenario’. In analysing the 
potential future developments in a pluralist European legal order,180 Kumm 
sketched two scenarios that might evolve: firstly, the ‘Cassandra scenario’, where 
constitutional courts frequently strike down Community legislation on the basis 
of their particular constitutional norms and values; and, secondly, the ‘Pangloss 
scenario’, in which the member states would only very rarely strike down a piece 
of legislation, and do so for very good reasons. He considers the latter scenario 
more likely and points out that, contrary to the usual fears about the end of the 
uniform application of Community law, such a scenario could be constructive, 
and even benefit the coherence of the Community legal order in the long-term. 
National courts in this case would be recognized as a constructive corrective force 
within the European polity, exerting pressure to enhance the democratic quality 
of decision-making on the European level; they provide the Court of Justice with 
an incentive to develop a sensitivity to the questions of legislative jurisdiction and 
to become more rigorous in its fundamental rights analysis.181 In order to secure, 
at the same time, the coherence of the Community legal order, the defeated measure 
would have to be renegotiated on the European level either generally182 or an 
exemption would have to be provided for that member state, or the national constitution 
ought to be amended. For deciding difficult cases, Kumm offers a set of 
conflict rules, which proceed from the frame of ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the 
State’ as a general jurisprudential approach.183 According to these rules, national 
constitutional courts ought to give precedence to their specific constitutional provisions 
only if those provisions are clear and specific and if they reflect an essential 
constitutional commitment.184 The national judge ought to seek guidance from 
both national and European law, be contextually sensitive, and strike a balance 
between competing principles, taking account of present-day political conditions 
 
180 Kumm, supra n. 9, p. 291 et seq. 
181 Ibid., p. 292. 
182 This has indeed earlier occurred with regard to ECJ cases C-159/90, The Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685, case C-450/93, Kalanke v. 
Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051 and case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange 
Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889, where declarations or treaty amendments were introduced in 
response to the ECJ judgments that had evoked concern amongst the member states. 
183 Kumm, supra n. 9, p. 288. 
184 Ibid., p. 297 et seq. 
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in the European Union and the member states.185 In fact, it has been suggested 
that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal did just that in its European Arrest Warrant 
decision when declaring a national implementing measure unconstitutional.186 
Indeed, the pragmatic approach of Central and Eastern European constitutional 
courts becomes even more evident in the light of the remarks made earlier about 
the activist stance of these constitutional courts and the supremacy and prominence 
of national constitutions in these countries. 
At the same time, whilst the Court of Justice has rightly been acclaimed for 
having responded to the national concerns in its more recent case-law, there appears 
to be ample room for such engagement on the part of the Court to go 
further in making the judicial ‘dialogues’ a genuine bi-directional exchange rather 
than unilateral self-restraint by the national constitutional courts. The previous 
section demonstrated that serious questions persist about the level of fundamental 
rights protection by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that references by the Court to specific national legal systems are perfunctory and 
haphazard, and, perhaps tellingly, no national constitutional court judgment has 
ever been cited in a Court of Justice judgment.187 Overall, as Everling has noted 
in his comment on the Banana decision, the Court may need to ‘reconsider its 
attitude’:188 
The role of the Court is no longer, as it perhaps was in the past, in the first place 
to strengthen the Community and its supranational elements as a sort of ‘integration 
motor’. As a real Constitutional Court, it has to ensure a balanced equilibrium 
between the competences, rights and functions of the institutions, Member 
States and citizens.189 
As regards the protection of fundamental rights, perhaps one way to proceed – if 
the Constitutional Treaty will be ratified or the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
will enter into effect by other means – might lie in making use of the avenues 
offered under Article 53 of the Charter, which provides that the rights set out in 
the Charter will be interpreted in accordance with the member states’ constitutions. 
Whilst this has been regarded as a general political statement without any 
consequences to supremacy of European Union law,190 and whilst the idea of 
 
185 Ibid., p. 290. 
186 See Komárek, supra n. 75, p. 5 and 25. 
187 De Witte, supra n. 158, p. 878. 
188 Everling, supra n. 156, p. 435. 
189 Ibid., Everling, supra n. 156, p. 436. 
190 J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law’, 38 CMLRev. (2001) p. 1198. 
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‘maximum protection’ has met objections on a variety of grounds,191 the shortcomings 
in the fundamental rights protection discussed above seem to warrant 
giving at least some consideration to the possibility of deploying this Article as a 
ground for introducing a somewhat higher degree of sensitivity to the national 
constitutions. 
The second remark concerns the role of political institutions in the equation of 
‘co-operative constitutionalism’. The issue of limits as to what judges can do highlights 
the need for actors beyond the judiciary to engage more actively in the ‘cooperative 
constitutionalism’, both at the national as well as at the European level. 
Whilst the focus of co-operative constitutionalism has been on the interaction 
between courts at different levels, the role of political institutions in such cooperation 
has received negligible consideration. In a number of cases where a 
conflict between Community law and national constitutional law has narrowly 
been averted, the constitutional courts appear to have been left with an unduly 
high burden in finding pragmatic solutions. In those cases, political actors, both 
at the national and the European levels, would have often been better placed to 
eliminate a potential conflict at an earlier stage. Indeed, when commenting on the 
Banana saga, Everling underscored that, whilst both the German courts and the 
Court of Justice need to adopt a co-operative approach, the responsibility of ensuring 
the right equilibrium lies, first and foremost, with the Commission; he 
posed the question why the Commission did not initiate fair compromises and 
take measures to eliminate the unacceptable effects of the Banana Regulation.192 
Monica Claes has astutely pointed out that the words of warning of national 
constitutional courts are not aimed only to the Court of Justice, but also to the 
Community institutions, and to the institutions of the member states whether 
acting in the capacity as the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ at the European level or as 
constitution-makers at the national level.193 These warnings imply that by transferring 
powers to Europe, the member states should not be able to escape scrutiny 
under the national constitutions.194 As regards negotiating on the European level, 
Germany, for instance, has indeed come to be known to ‘play the constitutional 
card’ when the German Constitutional Court signals that a particular politically 
unwelcome piece of legislation may be unconstitutional.195 Constitutional constraints 
now directly shape German positions in the Council, and the Länder 
governments and parliamentary actors have gained more say in negotiations over 
191 For the ‘maximum protection’ approach, see Besselink, supra n. 161, p. 670 et seq.; for 
objections, see, e.g., De Witte, supra n. 158, p. 881. 
192 Everling, supra n. 156, p. 473. 
193 Claes, supra n. 2, p. 650, see also p. 389. 
194 Ibid., p. 650. 
195 Kumm, supra n. 9, p. 281. 
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specific European policies.196 This represents what in a broader context of the 
interaction between the legislature and the constitutional courts has been 
characterised as a ‘larger anticipatory effect’197 or a ‘prospective, indirect, and 
creative dimension’198 of the decisions of constitutional courts, making ‘legislators 
engage in structured deliberations of the constitutionality of legislative proposals.’ 
199 Against this background, the European Constitutional Treaty – should 
it ever enter into effect – envisages several welcome reforms, such as the incorporation 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the clarification of competences, 
the introduction of the early warning mechanism whereby national parliaments 
would be involved more closely in monitoring the observance of the principle of 
subsidiarity, the expected reduction in recourse to what is currently Article 308 
EC Treaty, and the facilitation of the standing rules. Another welcome development 
is the Commission’s unilateral commitment since 2001 to conduct a review 
of compatibility of its legislative proposals with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
As regards the national level, Matthias Kumm has pointed out that the courts 
play a significant role as contributors to democratic deliberations in the member 
states over how the European Union should develop, and act as catalysts for amending 
national constitutions to keep them up with successive steps towards an ever 
closer Union.200 The analysis of Central and Eastern European case-law in the 
previous sections indeed demonstrates that national political institutions need to 
show an elevated level of flexibility and co-operation in domestic implementation 
of European Union obligations. In fact, a dialogue with national parliaments rather 
than open warnings to the Court of Justice figured as a recurring thread in a 
number of EU-related cases in the new member states. In particular, the legislatures 
need to eliminate manifest conflicts with European Union law from the 
national constitutions, draft the acts implementing European Union obligations 
in a way that exhausts the margin of discretion left for the protection of fundamental 
rights, and the parliamentary groups need to display more flexibility to 
ensure a timely adoption of legal acts, especially those pertaining to tax obligations. 
Last, but not least, the national political institutions generally need to show a 
higher awareness of, and responsibility to, the norms of the national constitutions, 
given that the hands of the constitutional courts are rather tied due to the 
196 Alter, supra n. 2, p. 118. 
197 E. Blankenburg, ‘Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule of Law in Germany’, 
in H. Jacob et al. (eds.), Courts, Law and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, 
Conn., Yale University Press 1996) p. 249-316 at p. 309, cited in Alter, supra n. 2, p. 118. 
198 Stone Sweet, supra n. 27, p. 73. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Kumm, supra n. 9, p. 292. 
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supremacy of Community law. Such a role for the parliaments may become particularly 
important in Central and Eastern Europe, where the new post-communist 
constitutions have a distinctly legal character and have been ‘taken seriously’ 
in the domestic context of governance. That is, unless, by virtue of accession to 
the European Union, a move towards a greater ‘constitutional amorphousness’ 
has been tacitly accepted. 
 
 
 
